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This paper examines whether the employment outcomes of labour market 
programme (LMP) participants in Australia vary according to whether they receive 
housing assistance (HA). In recent decades, there has been a shift in policy away from 
passive receipt of income support towards an emphasis on economic participation. 
This has led to the development of mutual obligation policies in many countries such 
as Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), Canada and New 
Zealand.  These policies are based on the concept of “reciprocal obligation” where 
receipt of unemployment benefits is conditional on active participation in LMPs 
(Burgess, 2000: 173-174).  
Following a series of pilot schemes, and the 1997 “Work for the Dole” 
legislation, Mutual Obligation Activities (MOAs) were formally implemented in 
Australia in July 1998. Under these reforms, Australians unemployed for six months 
or longer and receiving an unemployment benefit must participate in a LMP to remain 
eligible for these benefits (Yeend, 2004). MOA requirements initially applied only to 
18-to-24 year olds who have been unemployed for six months. Unemployment 
benefits for claimants aged 21 years or over were referred to as Newstart Allowance 
and as Youth Allowance for those aged under 21 years. In 1999, MOA requirements 
were extended to recipients aged 25-34 who had been unemployed for 12 months 
(Curtain, 2000). From 2002, MOA requirements were standardised for all Newstart or 
Youth Allowance recipients aged under 50 who had been unemployed for six months 
or more (Treasurer, 2002).  
1997 also saw the introduction of the New Deal by the UK government 
(McQuaid and Greig, 2004). Under the UK programme, 18-to-24 year olds who had 
been in receipt of unemployment benefit for six months and 25-to-59 year olds who 
had been receiving unemployment benefit for two years were subject to mandatory 
participation in LMPs in return for continued benefit receipt (Dickens et al., 2000).ii 
Around the same time the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) was passed in the US requiring recipients to work in 
order to receive welfare payments. These US reforms also embrace lifetime limits on 
receipt of income support (see Blank, 2002 for details). 
A series of studies conducted by policy analysts and academics have explored 
the impact of Housing Assistance (HA) on the employment outcomes of LMP 
participants. Most of these studies suggest that LMP initiatives are more likely to 
result in positive outcomes if those enrolled are receiving HA.  Five reasons have 
been advanced to explain these findings. First, HA recipients have more secure and 
stable housing arrangements that make the search for employment opportunities more 
productive. So, for example, an address for correspondence and security of tenure in 
public housing can aid transitions into employment by making it easier to take 
advantage of programmes designed to help prepare for and hold a job (Van Ryzin et 
al., 2003).iii Second, HA can help the unemployed to relocate closer to employment 
opportunities where the housing cost burden is more onerous (Fletcher et al., 2008). 
Third, HA can improve the ability of low income workers to keep jobs by freeing up 
resources that can be used to meet work-related expenses such as childcare and 
transportation (Verma and Hendra, 2003). Fourth, concentrations of joblessness are 
commonplace in areas dominated by social housing (Brennan et al., 2000).  If 
mandatory participation in LMPs does increase labour market attachment it effects 
will be more visible and detectable in areas dominated by asocial housing (Dickens et 
al., 2000). Finally, if HA recipients are more prone to low-income traps that deter 
labour market participation, reforms that introduce work obligations can have a 
potentially larger impact upon this group because they override blunt work incentives 
(Verma et al., 2003). 
Some of the institutional arrangements governing the delivery of HA in the 
US are idiosyncratic (section 8 housing vouchers, for example), and might shed some 
doubt on the relevance of all these pathways in other countries. But the last 
proposition above is particularly relevant in the Australian context. The evidence 
indicates that Australian HA recipients’ poverty and unemployment traps are 
generally ‘deeper’ than those experienced by other income support recipients (Wood 
et al., 2005; Dockery et al., 2008a). Indeed HA clients’ work incentives have become 
a major concern among Australian policy makers. This is reflected in the 2003 
Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement which required state and territory 
governments to reform rent-setting formulae in ways consistent with the promotion of 
economic participation among public housing tenants. Its successor, the 2009 
National Affordable Housing Agreement, aspires to house all Australians in 
affordable housing that contributes to economic participation (Council of Australian 
Governments, 2009, p3). Mutual obligation policies might then generate a relatively 
large lift in employment participation among clients of HA programmes in Australia, 
and if findings confirm this expectation, they should be of particular interest to policy 
makers. The issue also deserves special attention in view of declining employment 
participation rates among particular groups of HA recipients. This decline has been an 
especially steep one among males in public housing, despite a stronger Australian 
labour market in recent years (Wood et al., 2009).iv  
To explore these policy issues, we take a sample of 684 unemployed persons 
that have reported participation in MOAs and labour market programmes. We 
examine whether subsequent employment profiles are superior for recipients of HA. 
In summary, we find contrary to US studies, that participants in Australian LMPs 
have employment outcomes that do not vary with the HA status of participants. We 
believe this is due to differences in institutional arrangements governing the delivery 
of HA that are critical to welfare-to-work outcomes.  Countries that are considering 
reform of HA programmes with a view to promoting employment might be well-
advised to consider the governance arrangements shaping access to and delivery of 
HA. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Previous literature 
comparing the labour market outcomes of welfare-to-work reforms by HA status is 
summarised in Section 2. The data and modelling approach are described in Section 3 
while empirical results are presented and interpreted in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 






Australia has historically had a market-based housing system with 
homeownership rates that have hovered around 70% since the 1960s. Nevertheless, 
there are two major HA programmes that feature prominently in Australian housing 
governance arrangements. Public housing is a rationed form of assistance provided by 
State governments; it is housing for those in most need, and at rents that are set at a 
fixed percentage – typically 25% - of assessable income. There is therefore a rent 
subsidy benefiting tenants in public housing provided their incomes are such that the 
income-related formula  results in a rent below market rent. Public housing in 
Australia has historically provided security of tenure to its tenants, an attribute that is 
absent in Australian private rental housing, which has no tradition of tenancy 
regulation. Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA) is a non-rationed form of 
assistance provided by the Federal government to income support payment recipients 
renting from private landlords and Community Housing Organisations.v CRA 
entitlement is fixed across the income range within which the household retains 
eligibility for the income support payment that acts as a ‘passport’ to CRA eligibility. 
It is then withdrawn at the same taper rate as is applied in determining withdrawal of 
the passport income support payment. 
In 2006, there were 1.1 million recipients of CRA and 618,000 tenants in 
public housing. There were 187000 on public housing waiting lists in the same year 
(Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2007). HA is 
therefore a welfare programme that touches on the lives of hundreds of thousands of 
Australians.vi It has unsurprisingly become an issue of relevance in debates 
concerning welfare dependency and rates of economic participation among those on 
welfare rolls. 
Standard choice theoretic economic analysis of labour supply suggests that 
the impacts of HA programmes on labour supply are ambiguous. The typical 
approach assumes that workers make a choice between work hours and leisure at a 
fixed or exogenously determined wage rate. The introduction of income-related HA 
programmes results in substitution and income effects that can impact on labour 
supply in different directions. If leisure is a normal good such that hours of leisure 
increase with increments in real income, then the choice theoretic analysis of labour 
supply unambiguously predicts that assistance will blunt work incentives and reduce 
rates of economic participation among HA recipients. As a result, those eligible for 
HA are thought to be a group particularly prone to welfare dependency. This type of 
economic analysis has informed the direction of welfare-to-work reforms in various 
countries. These reforms often include making receipt of welfare conditional upon 
active participation in LMPs. 
However, the implications of choice theoretic models in the HA context may 
not be as straightforward as suggested above. Murray (1980) and Schone (1992) point 
out that assistance provided in the form of public housing is closer to a ‘pure’ in-kind 
transfer, where assistance is provided in the form of a ‘take it or leave it’ bundle of 
shelter services, than a ‘pure’ cash transfer in which support is received in the form of 
a cash sum that is spent by the recipient on consuming goods and services. The 
distinction is important because in-kind transfers can cause work effort to increase if 
the assistance is provided in a form that is complementary to work. Furthermore, in-
kind transfers typically impose more of the in-kind transfer than would be chosen at 
market prices and an equivalent cash transfer. Increases in earnings raise the value of 
the in-kind transfer, and drive real income up by more than the dollar value of the 
boost to earnings. The incentive to increase hours of work is then greater under the in-
kind assistance than with an equivalent cash transfer (Murray, 1980; Schone, 1992).   
The recent spate of studies  examining the employment impacts of HA has 
been motivated by policy reforms aiming to improve employment participation 
among welfare recipients. The literature is dominated by US studies. Many of these 
studies have used experimental approaches where families have been randomly 
assigned between treatment groups, which are subject to policy reforms, and control 
groups that continue under the existing policy regime. The experimental approach was 
made possible when the US Department of Health and Human Services granted 
waivers to some US states on adopting welfare policy changes, but only on condition 
that those states conducted random-assignment evaluations of any changes. Within 
counties or welfare office zones, some welfare receiving families were randomly 
subjected to the new welfare policies, thus creating a treatment group. Families on 
welfare but not subjected to the new policies form the control group. Studies 
incorporating these random-assignments find that HA recipients exhibit superior 
employment outcomes relative to welfare recipients not receiving HA. Findings in 
support of this conclusion can be found in Lee et al., (2003) using data for Indiana 
and Delaware, Miller et al., (1997) and Miller (1998) using data for Minnesota, 
Verma et al., (2003) for the states of Minnesota and Connecticut and Riccio and 
Orenstein (2001) using data for Atlanta. 
But Susin (2005) and Harkness and Newman (2006) obtain different findings. 
They adopt quasi-experimental approaches that create control groups by matching the 
personal characteristics of HA recipients with those of a sample of welfare programme 
participants ineligible for HA. Susin (2005) finds that housing subsidy programs 
reduce individual earnings by roughly 15 percent while Harkness and Newman (2006) 
suggest that employment outcomes for single mothers receiving housing assistance did 
not statistically differ from those ineligible.  
 Results from non-experimental studies are less conclusive. McQuaid and 
Greig (2004) estimate an employment model using a small sample survey of 306 
unemployed jobseekers from 13 employment service job centres in Scotland, and find 
that residence in public housing has neither a positive or negative impact on 
employment outcomes. Similarly, Van Ryzin et al. (2003) and Corcoran and Heflin 
(2003) find that HA has little impact, either way, on the employment and earnings of 
welfare recipients in New York and Michigan state respectively. 
A further group of studies compares employment and related outcomes by 
HA status, but once clients have left welfare rolls. Verma and Hendra (2003) suggest 
that leavers in Los Angeles County with tenant-based assistance were somewhat more 
likely to have positive employment outcomes. In Massachusetts Nagle (2003) offers 
evidence indicating that HA recipients were somewhat more likely to be employed 
but with a lower average hourly wage. Stronger results are presented in Friedman et 
al., (2003) who find that HA is essential in the transition from welfare to work, and 
from homelessness to independent living in secure housing. 
While this paper is the first Australian study to consider the combined effect 
of HA and compulsory participation in LMPs on employment outcomes, there have 
been two other important and related contributions. Firstly, Richardson (2002) 
estimates a proportional hazard model to measure  the impact of MOA on the long-
term unemployed and their unemployment spells. The study reveals that while MOAs 
have some marginal impact on the probability of leaving welfare, the programme did 
not affect the average duration that individuals were actually on welfare rolls 
(Richardson, 2002, pp.407). Secondly, Lim (2008) evaluated the impacts of MOAs on 
mature age Newstart Allowance recipients’ employment participation decision-
making using a longitudinal dataset created to administer income support payments 
for the unemployed. The study reveals that only 2.2 per cent of recipients participated 
in a MOA program, completed it, took up paid employment and subsequently left 
welfare. 
We consider a sample of long-term unemployed Australians and ask whether 
the receipt of HA shapes their employment outcomes. We also explore whether the 
type of HA received matters. A panel dataset is employed to address these key 
research questions. The following section describes data sources and model 
specifications.   
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
 Data and Sample 
 
This paper utilises waves 1 to 6 of the Household Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey covering the period 2001-06. The HILDA 
Survey is a nationally representative panel survey of Australian households and 
individuals. The HILDA Survey comprehensively covers the three inter-related areas 
of income, labour and household dynamics. Among other things, the survey contains 
a myriad of variables describing labour market histories, LMP participation, housing 
circumstances and socio-demographic characteristics, all of which are pertinent to the 
present analysis. The timeframe of data collection begins not long after the Australian 
introduction of MOAs in 1998.  
Our sample is restricted to all ‘compulsory’ working age LMP participants. 
Working age persons are non-dependent persons aged 15-64 during the timeframe 
2001 – 2006.vii Compulsory LMP participants are persons in the labour force, that is 
available for and seeking work, who have been required by Centrelink or a Job 
Network provider to participate in a LMP in the financial year leading up to their 
wave of interview.viii Centrelink is the Australian government agency administering 
Federal income support payments to eligible persons such as unemployed persons on 
low incomes, and a Job Network provider (replaced by Job Services Australia in July 
2009) is an organisation providing employment services that assist jobseekers to find 
work. The range of eligible MOA activities can be grouped under three broad 
categories. Firstly, Employment and community participation covers activities such as 
Work for the Dole, community work or any form of paid part-time employment. 
Secondly,  the Training category include defence force reserve or approved language, 
literacy and numeracy schooling (Centrelink, 2008). The third category, Employment 
assistance, is a one-to-one programme that helps prepare unemployed persons for 
work opportunities by guiding job search, helping with the preparation of resumes and 
so on (Lim, 2008).  
A person is defined as a HA recipient (public housing tenant or CRA 
recipient) if the person received HA at any time between waves 1 to 6. Public housing 
tenants are readily identifiable from the dataset as renters whose landlord is a state 
housing authority. CRA recipients are not recorded in the dataset. However, eligibility 
for CRA can be imputed based on the respondents’ answers to questions regarding 
their housing tenure, rent payments and receipt of income support payments (Wood 
and Ong, 2008).  
A person-period data set is created by including each wave from the point in 
time that unemployed persons were required to enrol in a LMP between 2001 and 
2006. There were 684 persons enrolled during the sample period but 229 or 33.5% 
have attrited at some point since first observed as a LMP participant. However, the 
attrition rates among the LMP participants receiving  HA (32%) and other LMP 
participants (35%) are not statistically significantly different, suggesting that the 
process of attrition is not correlated with HA status. The sample of 684 persons is 
retained, though for approximately one-third of the sample, the number observations 
is less than the maximum possible.ix 
Of this sample of 684 MOA participants, 310 (45%) are HA recipients, CRA 
being the more common form of HA received.x A MOA participant may have 
enrolled in more than one programme during the time period of analysis. The 
Employment assistance category is the largest programme regardless of HA status. 
There are different patterns in the other categories, with HA recipients much more 
likely to enrol in the employment and community participation and training 
categories. These differences are statistically significant. 
We use a quasi-experimental study design. It treats the sample of LMP 
participants as if they had been randomly assigned into 2 groups - participants (the 
‘treatment’ group) and non-participants (the ‘control’ group) in HA programmes. 
While HA status might have employment effects among LMP participants, inferior 
employment outcomes will often lead to eligibility for HA. The threat this poses to 
the study design’s credibility is tempered by the observation that our sample is drawn 
exclusively from the pool of unemployed. The sample is then comprised of 
individuals that are equally likely to be eligible for HA by virtue of their labour 
market status. Nevertheless, the HA variables are lagged in some of the empirical 
modelling as a precaution.  
The quasi-experimental study design is more robust if the treatment and 
control groups meet two criteria. First, at any point in time the treatment and control 
groups should be indistinguishable with respect to measured characteristics shaping 
employment outcomes, as would be expected with a randomised experimental study 
design. This expectation is investigated in Table 1, which compares the key 
characteristics of HA and non-HA participants as measured when first enrolled in 
LMPs. Those admitted on to HA programmes are more likely to be female, younger 
(under 34 years) and indigenous. They are also more likely to be sole parents and 
have very young children (0-4 years). Labour market histories are also different. HA 
recipients have spent less time in employment - and more time unemployed - since 
leaving full time education.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Second, as we are conducting a comparison of employment profiles over 
time intervals subsequent to enrolment in LMPs, our concern is not just with cross 
section differences in profiles, as in Table 1. The research approach is more robust if 
the charcateristics of treatment and comparison groups do not diverge over the time 
interval studied (Meyer, 1995).xi Table 2 computes the difference in key time-varying 
demographic and socioeconomic variables over the time period separating enrolment 
in LMPs (the ‘starting’ observation) and the most recent observation (the ‘end’ 
observation) - wave 6 in most cases.xii 
Column 3 shows whether there have been significant changes over time 
within the HA group. Column 6 shows the same within group estimates for the non-
HA group. Comparing the two columns, it is evident that both groups registered a fall 
in the proportion of singles and increases in the incidence of couples with dependents, 
those holding post-school qualifications and rates of disability. There are a few 
divergent trends. An increasing proportion of households receiving HA are couples 
with dependents and families with three or more children, but the opposite trend is 
apparent among other LMP participants. A declining proportion of HA recipients are 
childless, but an increasing proportion of other LMP participants are childless.   
Column 7 presents tests of significance in difference–in–difference 
estimates. They suggest that changes in the composition of the two groups have been 
generally similar over the period analysed. But statistically significant difference-in-
difference estimates are evident with respect to the incidence of couples with 
dependents, parenting three or more children, the presence of children aged less than 
ten years and childless households. The correlation between presence of children and 
HA status is unsurprising as households can become eligible for CRA if they receive 
Family Tax Benefit, an Australian transfer programme offering assistance to parents 
satisfying income and asset means tests. Since the presence of children can impact 
labour supply choices, it is important to have controls for these personal 
characteristics in the employment models.  
Of particular importance to the current paper are changes in rates of 
employment. There is a large lift in employment rates from 50% to 63% (a 13 
percentage point increase) among those never eligible for HA. While starting 
employment rates among HA recipients are lower at 29%, there is a somewhat higher 
16 percentage point increase to 45%. However, these trend increases are not 
significantly different between the two groups (even at the 10% level of significance). 
Among those employed at both start and end dates there are also large increases in 
weekly wages – from $381 to $509 for HA recipients and from $564 to $696 among 
others. Again, the trend increases are not significantly different between the two 
groups. This paper proceeds by employing panel model techniques to more rigorously 
compare employment profiles.  
 




A random effects logit panel model of employment is estimated. Given the existence 

















where Hi is a HA status variable, Xit is a vector of control variables, ui is the 
unobserved individual specific effect, itε ~N(0,
2σ ) and |iu Hi,Xit ~ (0,ψ
2).xiii The 
exogeneity assumptions are:  
),,|(0)|( iitiititii uXHEXHuE ε==       (2) 
The vector of control variables include type of LMP, age, gender, disability 
status, household type, number and age of children, ethnicity, location, educational 
qualifications and labour market history. (See table A1 in the appendix for variable 
definitions and measurement.) Calendar year dummies (2002 omitted) are introduced 
to capture changing labour market conditions  – the national unemployment rate fell 
from 6.1% in 2002 to 4.5% in 2006 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Tables 1 
and 2 suggest that the exogeneity assumptions may not hold because of omitted 
variables. We therefore  adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach (see Mundlak, 
1978; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004 and Baxter et al. 2008) in which the 
deviation from each LMP participant’s mean housing assistance (Hi(t-1) - iH ) and iH  
is included as in the following model specification; 
( ) )3(.......2,1,........2,1,2)1(1* TtNiuXHHHY itiitiitiit ==++′+′+−′= − εβαα  
Equation (3) collapses to the original random effects model if .21 ααα ′=′=′  The 
deviation ( )iti HH −− )1(  is an IV because it is correlated with Hit but uncorrelated with 
the random intercept ui. An unobservable such as innate ability that varies across 
LMP participants and could be correlated with HA status, will not vary across time 
for the same LMP participant and cannot therefore be correlated with ( )iti HH −− )1( . In 
fact it is not necessary to subtract the individual mean iH from Hi(t-1), as (3) can be 
rewritten as: 
( ) )4(.......2,1,)( 12)1(1* TtuXHHY itiititiit =++′+′−′+′= − εβααα
 
The estimate 1α̂ ′  is the ‘within’ LMP participant effect derived from 
comparing employment status for the same LMP participant when eligible for HA in 
some waves and not others. The intuition behind the instrumental variable approach is 
that the iH  variable will capture the influence of unobservables that act as partial 
determinants of labour market outcomes. So for example, innate ability could 
systematically vary between the unemployed with sustained spells on HA and those 
with little or no eligibility. On the other hand, the Hi(t-1) variable exploits the 
longitudinal nature of the data, in particular the same person’s transitions on and off 
HA programmes, to detect the independent effect that HA has on employment 
outcomes. Time-invariant characteristics like innate ability will be constant for the 
same person, and will not therefore be confounded with that same person’s transitions 
on and off HA. 
There is considerable churning in and out of HA programmes to permit 
estimation of 1α̂ ′ , the ‘true effect’ of HA. The percentage of those eligible for HA in 
year t+1 but not receiving HA in year t varies from 12% in 2004 to 20% in 2002. 
Those not enrolled in HA programmes in year t+1, but receiving HA in year t varies 
from 15% in 2004 to 27% in 2003. 
 
4. Results and Interpretation 
 
Table 3 reports the results from estimation of the random effects panel model 
(equation 1) and the IV panel model (equation 4). xiv  It lists coefficient estimates and 
the calculated marginal effect at the sample mean. The key emphasis of this paper is 
on whether HA improves the employment prospects of LMP participants. Results 
from estimation of the random effects model indicate that those enrolled in HA 
programmes have a 22 percentage points lower probability of employment, a marginal 
effect estimate that is highly significant. This finding is evident despite controls for 
gender, the presence of young children, type of LMP programme, age, ethnicity and 
labour market history – all personal characteristics that we know differ by HA status 
(see Tables 1 and 2), and might also be expected to impact labour market outcomes. 
But as pointed out in our discussion ofmodel specification in section 3, it is likely that 
this 22 percentage point estimate captures the impact of unobservables that are 
correlated with both HA eligibility and labour market outcomes.  
So we now turn to the IV estimates reported in the final two columns of Table 
3. The coefficient 1α̂ ′   is positive with a marginal effect estimate suggesting that 
employment probabilities are raised by 12 percentage points. But the estimate is 
statistically insignificant. In contrast, the estimate )ˆˆ( 12 αα ′−′  is highly statistically 
significant and negative.  Results from these specifications indicate that unmeasured 
heterogeneity makes the HA variable (Hit) endogenous, and that the unmeasured 
variables depress the post-LMP participation employment profiles of those enrolled in 
HA programmes. However, once we account for endogeneity of the HA variable our 
estimates suggest that labour market programme participants receiving HA are no 
more likely to obtain better (or worse) employment outcomes than other labour 
market program participants. These findings imply that either HA is unimportant for 
employment outcomes, or that any incentive effects depressing work effort are offset 
by employment promoting benefits. Unpacking the various positive and negative 
causal connections provided by HA remains an area for future research. xv 
A number of other results are worthy of comment.  The type of LMP and the 
timing of post-LMP participation observations are highly significant and important. 
Enrolment in Employment and community participation is associated with a 29 
percentage point lower probability of employment (relative to enrolment in 
Employment assistance programmes). Unsurprisingly, as labour market conditions 
strengthened between 2002 and 2006 employment prospects improved; a LMP 
participant has a 32% higher probability of employment in 2006 as compared to 2002.  
The models include a number of socio-demographic variables. Age and an age 
squared variable is included to capture a non-linear relationship between age and the 
probability of being employed.   Results indicate that the probability of employment 
increases with age up to 24 years but then starts to fall. This inverted-U shaped 
relationship is consistent with other studies.xvi Disability lowers employment 
probabilities by 29 percentage points, which is the second highest impact of any 
dichotomous variable. The presence of children, particularly very young dependents, 
might be expected to positively impact on the probability of employment, but turns 
out to be unimportant in this model.  Since over 50% of the sample are singles and 
over two-thirds are childless we may have an insufficient number of parents to detect 
any significant influence. Ethnicity variables are also unimportant but the indigenous 
account for only 6% of the sample, so small sample numbers might be an issue here 
as well. Residence in a major city location raises the probability of employment by 20 
percentage points relative to location in inner regions, confirming the superior 
employment opportunities that usually exist in the ‘deeper’ labour markets of major 
urban areas. 
Among the human capital variables, qualifications are unimportant, but labour 
market history is a large and significant influence. Over 50% of the sample have no 
post-school qualifications. On the other hand there is considerable variation in 
employment histories. Just over 10% of the sample has never worked, while around 
63% have worked for more than one-half of their careers to date. This variation in 
employment history is an important influence. A one standard deviation increase in 
time in paid work (from a mean 62% to 91% of time since leaving full time 
education) increases the predicted probability of employment (in 2006) from 55% to 
65%.xvii Conversely a history of unemployment seriously damages  job prospects. A 
one standard deviation increase in time unemployed (from a mean 20% to 46%) 
lowers the predicted probability of employment by 6 percentage points (55% to 49%). 
LMP participants that have been unemployed for long periods experience depreciation 
of their human capital, and can also become discouraged, hence searching for 
employment less intensively. It is also possible that employers use employment 
history as a signal of reliability and capability. Whatever the reason the employment 
‘track records’ of LMP participants is clearly a critical factor shaping labour market 
outcomes. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
 Table 4 explores whether unpacking the HA variable into its constituent 
programmes (public housing and CRA) offers a richer interpretation. Different 
findings might be anticipated in view of the varying institutional arrangements that 
govern eligibility and entitlement with respect to the two programmes. Public housing 
is rationed with eligible applicants entering queues that are so lengthy that wait times 
often exceed 12 months. Eligibility for public housing must be maintained in order to 
retain a position in the queue and this can deter applicants from accepting job offers. 
Transitions into public housing might then be more powerfully associated with lifts in 
rates of employment than CRA, where entitlement is automatic if eligibility criteria 
are met. But the IV variables are again positive and insignificant; transitions onto 
either HA programme appears to have no significant independent effect on 
employment participation. On the other hand, we find that the mean CRA variable iC  
is significant and once again negative while the mean public housing variable P  is 
insignificant, though again negative. In view of the much larger number of CRA 
recipients in our sample, this last result is perhaps unsurprising. It is also noteworthy 
that findings with respect to socio-demographics, human capital, employment history 
and type of LMP are consistent with those reported in Table 3.   
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
The mutual obligation programme established in Australia during the late 
1990s reflects part of a growing international emphasis on economic participation by 
welfare recipients. Using a sample of unemployed Australians who have been 
required to participate in LMPs, this paper has examined the impact of HA on 
employment outcomes. Results from the estimation of random effects panel models 
provide little evidence that HA has any independent impact on the probability of 
employment of LMP participants – either positive or negative.  
These findings contrast with the positive results presented in a number of US 
random experiment and non-experimental studies.  We put forward two possible 
explanations for the different findings. Firstly, CRA is the main HA programme 
received by the Australian HA group and it is an entitlement available to all income 
eligible residents of private rental housing. The US equivalent, housing voucher 
programmes, is rationed with income eligible renters joining queues. The sample 
design in US studies is typically restricted to renters enrolled in welfare programmes. 
If most are eligible for vouchers, as seems likely, the HA group will be people that 
have reached the top of queues before or during the study time frame. The comparison 
group is then eligible welfare recipients still waiting in the queue. Those in queues are 
vulnerable to welfare locks – they have an incentive to reject job offers or job search 
less intensively to preserve eligibility (Dockery et al., 2008b). The HA variable in US 
studies could then be picking up welfare lock effects rather than positive synergies 
between welfare-to-work reforms and enrolment in HA programmes. If this 
explanation is valid, it follows that our Australian findings will have some relevance 
to other countries where welfare-to-work reforms are accompanied by HA 
programmes that are administered on an eligibility basis rather than rationed. Among 
English-speaking countries, for example, both the UK and New Zealand have 
introduced welfare-to-work reforms but their important income-related HA 
programmes (Housing Benefit in the UK, Accommodation Supplement in New 
Zealand) are entitlements where assistance is automatically provided to all those 
demonstrating eligibility.  
Secondly, the scope of the early Australian reforms was targeted on different 
groups as compared to their US counterparts. In the US, 1996 Federal reforms 
introducing mandatory work requirements and maximum time limits for receipt of 
welfare assistance were targeted on families with dependent children (Blank, 2002). 
As in the UK, compulsory LMP participation under Australia’s mutual obligation 
policies were originally targeted at young adults belonging to the pool of long-term 
unemployed. Those on disability support pensions and sole parent pensions were 
outside the scope of welfare-to-work reforms. Sole parents are particularly prone to 
poverty and unemployment traps if receiving HA in the form of public housing 
(Wood et al. 2009). It may be that as this group are brought within the scope of 
mutual obligation policies, the comparative employment profiles of HA recipients 
will begin to resemble those detected in US studies. However, on the basis of the 
empirical work conducted here we can find no evidence for synergies between 
Australian HA programmes and welfare-to-work reforms. 
Both these explanations emphasise cross country differences in institutional 
arrangements. If valid they imply a cautious approach when assessing evidence drawn 
from the impact of policy programmes in other countries. Policies that are effective in 
one institutional setting can prove ineffective under different institutional 
arrangements. In countries with relatively large social housing tenures and 
administered allocation mechanisms there are other reasons to doubt synergies 
between HA and welfare to work reforms. Rigid allocation rules can impede labour 
mobility among social housing tenants and reduce the effectiveness of LMP among 
those tenants.  
A further important policy finding from this paper is that concerning the 
effectiveness of alternative LMP activities. LMP participants undertaking 
Employment and Community Participation experience a lower probability of 
employment than those undertaking Employment assistance. Interestingly, Australian 
Employment Assistance activities are most like the US form of obligatory activity, 
which invariably seem to deliver a superior employment outcome (Miller, 1998; 
Riccio and Orenstein, 2001). Possible cream skimming or self selection effects could 




Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics in wave when first enrolled in LMP, by HA status,  
column per cent unless stated otherwise 
Characteristic  HA No HA All 
Female  42.9 34.5** 38.3 
Age band 15-19 11.3 9.1* 10.1 
 20-34 40.6 37.4* 38.9 
 35 or over 48.1 53.5 51.0 
Income unit type Couple with dependents 20.3 18.7 19.4 
 Couple without 
dependents 15.8 18.4 
17.3 
 Sole parent 12.6 5.3** 8.6 
 Single 51.3 57.5 54.7 
Number of dependent children Zero 67.1 75.9* 71.9 
 One 16.5 8.8** 12.3 
 Two 10.3 10.4 10.4 
 Three or more 0.1 0.0 5.4 
Mean number of children aged 0-4 years 0.2 0.1** 0.15 
 5-9 years 0.2 0.1 0.15 
 10-14 years 0.1 0.1 0.14 
Ethnicitya Australian non-Indigenous 66.5 73.0 70.0 
 Australian Indigenous 9.4 3.2** 6.0 
 Main English-speaking 7.1 8.8 8.0 
 Other 17.1 15.0 15.9 
Regionb Major city 58.1 54.3 56.0 
 Inner region 25.2 29.1 27.3 
 Outer or remote region 16.8 16.6 16.7 
Highest educational qualification Bachelor degree or higher 8.4 10.4 9.5 
 Other post-school 
qualification 
33.9 36.6 35.4 
 Year 12 or below 57.7 52.9 55.1 
Disability/long-term health condition  29.4 24.6 26.8 
Labour market history (% of time 
since left full-time education)  
Time in paid work  50.7 64.1** 57.9 
 Time unemployed  23.2 17.5** 20.1 
Employment ratec  28.4 49.7** 40.1 
Mean weekly wage of the employed 
($) 
 357 545** 180 
Source: Confidentialised unit records from the HILDA Survey waves 1-6 Release 6.0 
a. Main English Speaking countries are New Zealand, United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, Canada, US 
and South Africa. 
b. The regions are classified by remoteness area where each remoteness area represents an 
aggregation of non-contiguous geographical areas which share common characteristics of 
remoteness based on the Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA). Major cities are 
collection districts with an ARIA index of 0 to 0.2 and inner regions are collection districts with an 
average ARIA index greater than 0.2 but less than or equal to 2.4. For further details, refer to 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2001). 
c. In each year, the HILDA survey respondents are asked whether they have enrolled in a LMP since 
the last financial year and what their employment status is at the time of the interview. For 
example, a survey respondent who was interviewed in August 2001 would report LMP status 
based on whether s/he was enrolled in a LMP between July 2000 and August 2001, but 
employment status would be reported by the respondent based on his/her employment status in 
August 2001. Hence, if a respondent enrolled in a LMP in the last financial year became employed 
by the time of the interview, that respondent would be recorded as employed in the year when first 
enrolled in a LMP.  
** Statistically significantly different from HA participants at 1% level 
* Statistically significantly different from HA participants at 5% level 
 
Table 2: Changes in the composition of HA and non-HA groups, per cent unless stated otherwise 
  HA No HA Test of  



































Employment rate (%)  28.4 44.8 ** 49.7 63.1 **  
Mean weekly wage ($)a  381 509 ** 564 696 **  
Income unit type (%) Couple with dependents 20.3 26.1 ** 18.7 16.0 * ** 
 Couple without dependents 15.8 16.8  18.4 23.0 *  
 Sole parent 12.6 11.3  5.3 5.9   
 Single 51.3 45.8 * 57.5 55.1   
Number of dependent children (%) Zero 67.1 62.6 * 75.9 78.1  ** 
 One 16.5 16.1  8.8 8.6   
 Two 10.3 11.3  10.4 8.8   
 Three or more 6.1 10.0 ** 4.8 4.5  ** 
Mean number of children  Aged 0-4 years 0.23 0.30 * 0.09 0.08  * 
 Aged 5-9 years 0.16 0.24 ** 0.14 0.10  ** 
 Aged 10-14 years 0.14 0.15  0.14 0.14   
Region (%) Major cities 58.1 56.5  54.3 54.3   
 Inner regional 25.2 25.2  29.1 29.1   
 Outer or remote region 16.8 18.4  16.6 16.6   
Highest educational qualification  Bachelor degree or higher 8.4 9.0  10.4 10.7   
(%) Other post-school qualification 33.9 39.4 ** 36.6 40.9 **  
 Year 12 or below 57.7 51.6 ** 52.9 48.4 **  
Disability/long-term condition (%)  29.4 35.8 * 24.6 27.8   
Labour market history (% of time  Time in paid work 48.6 44.8 ** 62.2 59.4 *  
since left full-time education) Time unemployed 24.2 22.3 * 18.0 14.0 **  
Source: Confidentialised unit records from the HILDA Survey waves 1-6 Release 6.0 
Notes: 
a. Mean weekly wage in this table has been measured with respect to sample members who were employed both during the first and last observation. In the HA group, there 
are 48 such persons; in the non-HA group there are 154 such persons.  




Table 3: Random effects and IV model estimates 











Whether  received HA at some point during 




** -0.224    
Proportion of waves in receipt of HA ( iH , in per 
cent) 
   -0.018 
(0.005) 
** -0.004 
Whether received HA during wave t-1 (Hit-1)    0.510 
(0.344) 
 0.115 
LMP category (Employment assistance default)       









 -0.097 -0.405 
(0.425) 
 -0.097 
Year (2002 default)a 
2003 0.577 
(0.299) 















** 0.307 1.599 
(0.309) 
** 0.315 
Personal characteristics       
Age 0.208 
(0.075) 
** 0.0479 0.196 
(0.074) 
** 0.045 
Age squared -0.004 
(0.001) 










** -0.299 -1.241 
(0.226) 
** -0.291 
Income unit type (Single default)       
Couple with dependent children -0.443 
(0.479) 
 -0.105 -0.340 
(0.480) 
 -0.080 
Couple without dependent children 0.206 
(0.305) 
 0.047 0.175 
(0.305) 
 0.040 
Sole parent -0.434 
(0.554) 
 -0.104 -0.312 
(0.555) 
 -0.074 
Number of children       
Number of children aged 0-4 years -0.514 
(0.289) 
 -0.118 -0.498 
(0.290) 
 -0.115 
Number of children aged 5-9 years 0.095 
(0.295) 
 0.022 0.107 
(0.296) 
 0.025 
Number of children aged 10-14 years -0.020 
(0.317) 
 -0.005 0.003 
(0.318) 
 0.001 
Ethnicity (Australian non-Indigenous default)       
Australian Indigenous -0.595 
(0.638) 
 -0.144 -0.470 
(0.640) 
 -0.113 
Main English-speaking countriesb 0.050 
(0.486) 
 0.012 0.110 
(0.487) 
 0.025 
Other   -0.284 
(0.409) 
 -0.067 -0.291 
(0.408) 
 -0.069 
Region (Major city default)       
Inner region -0.856 
(0.319) 
** -0.204 -0.938 
(0.320) 
** -0.224 
Outer region -0.455 
(0.352) 
 -0.108 -0.538 
(0.354) 
 -0.128 















Bachelor degree or higher -0.166 
(0.480) 
 -0.039 -0.128 
(0.480) 
 -0.030 
Other post-school qualification 0.265 
(0.290) 
 0.060 0.249 
(0.290) 
 0.057 
Labour market history       
Time in paid work as a proportion of time since 
left full-time education 
0.028 
(0.005) 
** 0.006 0.027 
(0.005) 
** 0.006 
Time unemployed as a proportion of time since 
left full-time education 
-0.021 
(0.007) 





  -1.699 
(1.410) 
  
ψ2c  2.120 
(0.209) 
**  2.113 
(0.209) 
**  
ρc  0.577 
(0.048) 
**  0.576 
(0.048) 
  
Diagnostics       
Number of observations 1450   1450   
Number of groups 527   527   
Wald Chi2  148.23 **  149.25 **  
Likelihood ratio test of ρ=0 157.18 **  154.56 **  
Source: Confidentialised unit records from the HILDA Survey waves 1-6 Release 6.0 
Notes: 
a. All wave 1 observations are excluded due to the lagging of the housing assistance variables, leaving 
observations from wave 2 (2002) onwards for analysis.  
b. Main English Speaking countries are New Zealand, United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, Canada, US and South 
Africa. 
c. ψ2 is the variance of the between-individual error term. ρ is the proportion of the total variance contributed by 
the variance of the between-individual error term. 





Table 4: IV model estimates for disaggregated HA status 





Proportion of waves in receipt of CRA ( iC , in per cent) -1.127 
(0.368) 
** -0.264 
Whether received CRA during wave t-1 (Cit-1) 0.008 
(0.320) 
 0.002 
Proportion of waves in public housing ( P , in per cent) -0.046 
(0.622) 
 -0.011 
Whether in public housing during wave t-1 (Pit-1) 0.050 
(0.604) 
 0.012 
LMP category (Employment assistance default)    
































Income unit type (Single default)    
Couple with dependent children -0.393 
(0.479) 
 -0.093 
Couple without dependent children 0.252 
(0.307) 
 0.057 
Sole parent -0.440 
(0.554) 
 -0.106 
Number of children    
Number of children aged 0-4 years -0.542 
(0.289) 
 -0.125 
Number of children aged 5-9 years 0.059 
(0.295) 
 0.014 
Number of children aged 10-14 years -0.109 
(0.319) 
 -0.025 
Ethnicity (Australian non-Indigenous default)    
Australian Indigenous -0.670 
(0.641) 
 -0.163 
Main English-speaking countriesb 0.095 
(0.487) 
 0.022 
Other   -0.323 
(0.407) 
 -0.077 
Region (Major city default)    
Inner region -0.815 
(0.318) 
** -0.194 
Outer region -0.377 
(0.352) 
 -0.090 









Bachelor degree or higher -0.155 
(0.478) 
 -0.036 
Other post-school qualification 0.236 
(0.290) 
 0.054 
Labour market history    













ψ2c  2.105 
(0.209) 
**  
ρc  0.574 
(0.049) 
**  
Diagnostics    
Number of observations 1450   
Number of groups 527   
Wald Chi2  150.24 **  
Likelihood ratio test of ρ=0 152.41 **  
Notes: 
a. All wave 1 observations are excluded due to the lagging of the housing assistance variables, leaving observations 
from wave 2 (2002) onwards for analysis.  
b. Main English Speaking countries are New Zealand, United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, Canada, US and South Africa. 
c. ψ2 is the variance of the between-individual error term. ρ is the proportion of the total variance contributed by the 
variance of the between-individual error term. 














Dependent variable - 
whether employed 
Binary Time-varying 1 if a person is working one or more hours 
per week; 0 otherwise 
HA status    
Whether  received HA at 
some point during timeframe 
(Hi) 
 
Binary Time-invariant 1 if received HA at some point during waves 
1-6; 0 otherwise 
Proportion of waves in 
receipt of HA ( iH ) 
Continuous Time-invariant Number of waves in receipt of HA 
expressed as a percentage of total number of 
waves observed during timeframe 
Whether received HA during 
wave t-1 (Hit-1) 
Binary Time-varying 1 if received HA in wave t-1; 0 otherwise 
Proportion of waves in 
receipt of CRA ( iC , in per 
cent) 
Binary Time-invariant Number of waves in receipt of CRA 
expressed as a percentage of total number of 
waves observed during timeframe 
Whether received CRA 
during wave t-1 (Cit-1) 
Binary Time-varying 1 if received CRA in wave t-1; 0 otherwise 
Proportion of waves in 
public housing ( P , in per 
cent) 
Binary Time-invariant Number of waves in public housing 
expressed as a percentage of total number of 
waves observed during timeframe 
Whether in public housing 
during wave t-1 (Pit-1) 
Binary Time-varying 1 if in public housing in wave t-1; 0 
otherwise 
LMP category     
Employment assistance 
(default) 
Binary Time-invariant 1 if participated in a one-to-one programme 
that helps prepare unemployed persons for 
work opportunities by guiding job search, 
helping with the preparation of resumes and 
so on; 0 otherwise 
Employment and community 
participation 
Binary Time-invariant 1 if participated in activities such as Work 
for the Dole, community work or any form 
of paid part-time employment during 
timeframe; 0 otherwise 
Training Binary Time-invariant 1 if participated in training programmes 
such as defence force reserve or approved 
language, literacy and numeracy schooling; 
0 otherwise 
Year     
2002 (default) Binary Time-varying 1 if observation is from the 2002 calendar 
year; 0 otherwise 
2003 Binary Time-varying 1 if observation is from the 2003 calendar 
year; 0 otherwise 
2004 Binary Time-varying 1 if observation is from the 2004 calendar 
year; 0 otherwise 
2005 Binary Time-varying 1 if observation is from the 2005 calendar 
year; 0 otherwise 
2006 Binary Time-varying 1 if observation is from the 2006 calendar 
year; 0 otherwise 
Personal characteristics    
Age Continuous Time-varying Age in years 
Age squared Continuous Time-varying Age x age 
Female Binary Time-invariant 1 if female; 0 otherwise 
Disabled Binary Time-varying 1 if have a disability or long-term health 
condition; 0 otherwise 
Income unit type     
Couple with dependent 
children 
Binary Time-varying 1 if partnered and have dependent children; 
0 otherwise 
Couple without dependent 
children 
Binary Time-varying 1 if partnered and have no dependent 
children; 0 otherwise 










Single (default) Binary Time-varying 1 if single without dependent children; 0 
otherwise 
Number of children    
Number of children aged 0-4 
years 
Continuous Time-varying  
Number of children aged 5-9 
years 
Continuous Time-varying  
Number of children aged 10-
14 years 
Continuous Time-varying  
Ethnicity     
Australian non-Indigenous 
(default) 
Binary Time-invariant 1 if  born in Australia and not an Aboriginal 
or Torres Strait Islander; 0 otherwise 
Australian Indigenous Binary Time-invariant 1 if  born in Australia and an Aboriginal or 
Torres Strait Islander; 0 otherwise 
Main English-speaking 
countries 
Binary Time-invariant 1 if born in New Zealand, United Kingdom 
(UK), Ireland, Canada, US or South Africa; 
0 otherwise 
Other   Binary Time-invariant 1 if born outside Australia and the main 
English-speaking countries listed above; 0 
otherwise 
Region     
Major city (default) Binary Time-varying 1 if residing in a collection district with an 
Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia 
(ARIA) index of 0 to 0.2; 0 otherwise  
Inner region Binary Time-varying 1 if residing in a collection district with an 
average ARIA index greater than 0.2 and 
less than or equal to 2.4; 0 otherwise 
Outer region Binary Time-varying 1 if residing in a collection district with an 
average ARIA index greater than 2.4; 0 
otherwise 
Highest qualification     
Bachelor degree or higher Binary Time-varying 1 if highest qualification is a bachelor degree 
or higher; 0 otherwise 
Other post-school 
qualification 
Binary Time-varying 1 if highest qualification is a post-school 
qualification that is not a bachelor degree or 
higher; 0 otherwise 
No post-school qualification 
(default) 
Binary Time-varying 1 if highest qualification is Year 12 or 
lower; 0 otherwise 
Labour market history    
Time in paid work as a 
proportion of time since left 
full-time education 
Continuous Time-varying Time in paid work expressed as a percentage 
of time since left full-time education 
Time unemployed as a 
proportion of time since left 
full-time education 
Continuous Time-varying Time unemployed expressed as a percentage 
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i The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments from five anaonymous referees. The paper 
uses unit record data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
Survey. The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the Australian Government Department of 
Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) and is managed by the 
Melbourne Institute of Applied and Economic and Social Research (MIAESR). The findings and 
views reported in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to FaHCSIA, 
MIAESR or the referees. 
 
ii While New Deal programmes for unemployment benefit recipients are compulsory, there are also non-compulsory 
New Deal programmes available for other benefit recipients such as lone parents and people with disabilities, designed 
to support job search for those who wish to enroll in the programmes (Dickens et al 2000). 
 
iii Murray (1980) and Schone (1992) demonstrate in a formal choice theoretic framework that commodity subsidy 
programmes such as HA can cause labour supply to increase if the subsidized commodity and work are complements. 
This outcome is more likely if the subsidized commodity is rationed and offered in fixed quantities that exceed the 
quantity that would be consumed with an equivalent cash transfer.  
 
iv Declining employment participation among males in public housing is a notable trend in the UK as well (Dickens et 
al., 2000; Wadsworth, 1998). 
 
v CRA is paid at the rate of 75 cents per dollar of rent above the specified minimum rent threshold until the maximum 
rate is reached. These thresholds vary according to household size and type of income support program (Wood, Forbes 
and Gibb, 2005). 
 
vi Our definition of HA includes direct subsides but excludes indirect subsidies, in particular tax expenditures. While 
mortgage interest is not tax deductible in Australia, capital gains and net imputed rents are tax exempt. There has been 
speculation that this depresses the labour supply of mature age workers. But further exploration is outside the scope of 
this paper. 
 
vii Those enrolled in 2001 could have begun their program in an earlier year; those that record first participation in 2002 
or later have begun their program in that year. 
 
viii Unemployed respondents in the HILDA Survey are presented with a showcard listing the following LMPs and asked 
“... since (the last financial year), have you been required by Centrelink or a Job Network provider to do any of the 
following?”: Part-time study, part-time paid work, voluntary unpaid work, community work organised by a community 
work coordinator, Work for the Dole, job search training (training to search for jobs, write applications and prepare for 
interviews), approved literacy/numeracy training, Green Corps, Job Placement Employment and Training (JPET), 
Intensive Assistance (one-to-one help to plan your return to work and find and keep a job), Community Development 
Employment Projects, relocating to an area of better employment prospects, New Apprenticeship Access Program 
(training to get you into a new apprenticeship), Advanced English for Migrants, Job Pathway Program and Defence 




                                                                                                                                                                  
 
ix For persons first observed as a LMP participant in wave 1, the maximum number of observations is six. For persons 
first observed as a LMP participant in wave 2, the maximum number of observations is five and so on. 
 
x Among HA recipients, 207 (67%) received CRA only, 76 (24%) received public HA only and 27 (9%) received both 
forms of assistance at different points in time during the data timeframe. 
 
xi So, for example, if the HA group has a higher incidence of workplace injuries than the comparison group, differences 
in employment rates will emerge even if the groups were identical in all respects at the time of enrolment in LMPs. The 
difference in employment rates eventuates for reasons unrelated to HA status, but would be falsely attributed to HA 
status.  
 
xii Participants enrolling in a LMP in the financial year before wave 1 are treated as if they had enrolled in wave 1 for 
the purposes of calculating time interval computations. The time interval for HA recipients is 3 years, somewhat longer 
than the 2.5 year interval for the comparison group.  
 
xiii The random effects model (1) is fitted by maximum likelihood using xtlogit with the option re in STATA. 
xiv The null H0; ψ2 > 0 is equivalent to the hypothesis ui = 0. The likelihood ratio test statistic comfortably rejects the 
null at 1%, confirming the legitimacy of a person specific component in the error term (see the final row of Table 3). 
 
xv The statistical significance of other variables in the model is unchanged by the inclusion of an IV, and coefficient 
estimates are stable. A sample restricted to persons starting LMP participation between 2001 and 2006 was used to test 
whether any employment gains (post-LMP participation) prove to be temporary. A variable measuring years since 
starting LMP is found to be positive in both random effects and IV versions of the panel model, but insignificant. In the 
IV model  1α̂ ′  is again positive, but insignificant. Results are available from the author on request.  
xvi Increasing age from 18 to 24 years raises the predicted probability of employment from 75% to 77%; increasing age 
from 24 to 35 years lowers the predicted probability of employment from 77% to 71%. There is then a sharp fall in 
predicted probability from 71% to 42% as age increases from 35 to 49 years. 
 
xvii All variables other than calendar year (set equal to 2006) are set at mean values. 
